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TO INTERVENE OR NOT TO INTERVENE? POSITIONS 
OF THE MEMBER STATES TOWARDS THE ARTICLE 
18 OF THE EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD 
PROPOSAL
Martin Hrabálek1, Sylvie Burianová2
Abstract 
The paper is focused on how the “migration crisis” starting in 2015 in Europe have 
reshaped the attitude to the European level of border protection. The basic question is 
how different are the competences of European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) 
from the previous FRONTEX and what was the role sovereignty played in it. The paper 
has a character of a qualitative study where the authors compare the proposal for 
EBCG, mainly its Article 18 establishing the “right to intervene” in the proposal, with 
the final version of the document and analyzes the position of the Member states based 
on their posititions within the Council to the parts of the proposal that were most 
connected to sovereignty. The analysis is based on data collection from officials from 
various member states that were part of the negotiations. Apart from this “hidden 
agenda” the authors also analyze public statements by high-ranking government 
officials that often commented on the proposal.
KEY WORDS: European Union, borders, EBCG, migration crisis
INTRODUCTION 
The pressure of the migration crisis led the European Union to seek 
a solution to various problems that were connected to it. One of the core 
problems perceived both by the European Commission and the member 
states was the weakness of the external borders of the Union. Although 
the European Union has established already in 2005 an agency that was 
responsible for the coordination of activities at external borders (FRONTEX), 
its competences were rather limited and inadequate faced to the challenges 
of EU border protection during the crisis. 
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Many authors have previously pointed out to the fact that FRONTEX 
suffers from lack of competences and is dependent on the member states 
(Rijpma, 2010; Ekelund, 2014; Cortinovis, 2015). Events in Greece where 
in the midst of the crisis the possibility for FRONTEX to fully operate within 
the territory of the country was severely limited due to the lack of will of the 
country to cooperate, would show that the member states themselves with 
their concerns over sovereignty might be a major problem to the protection 
of borders in the EU.
In December 2015 the Commission had tabled a proposal for a Regulation 
on the European Border and Coast Guard, a follow up Agency to FRONTEX. 
The urgency to solve the problem of protection of European borders was 
reflected in a very tight schedule where the Council and the Parliament were 
to adopt an important proposal in co-decision within the framework of 7 
months. That only shows that strengthening of the competences of FRONTEX 
was perceived as a necessary part of the solution for migration crisis. 
One of the crucial parts of the proposal was the Article 18 that stated 
that the „Agency would have a right to intervene in situations at the external 
border requiring urgent action on the basis of a Commission implementing 
decision“. This Article raised serious concerns over Articles 4(2) TEU and 
72 TFEU that make the member states responsible for their own internal 
security, making it both legally and politically controversial.
The aim of the article is to concentrate on the key part of the proposal 
connected to the state sovereignty and the transfer of competences to the 
European Commission/EBCG. The abovementioned Article 18 was a key 
part of the proposal that would change the balance more towards the Union 
level and give more powers to the Commission. In the paper we will discuss 
why this ambitious part of the Commission proposal did not succeed and 
what the positions of the member states towards it were. We will try to 
categorize the member states into three different groups – those that would 
support the Article 18, those that would be cautious and those who would 
openly criticize it. As for the position, we will use both those stated publicly 
by the key representatives of the member states and the positions in the 
Council formation while the proposal was discussed. 
The structure of the article is following. In the first part we will present the 
nexus between the borders and state sovereignty. In the second part we will 
discuss the development of border cooperation and FRONTEX, including an 
important period before the Agency was established during which a number 
of ideas how the European level of border protection should function were 
presented, including different levels of competence transfers. These debates 
44 Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, Volume 19, 2019, No. 1
CEEOL copyright 2020
CEEOL copyright 2020
are important in order to provide historical overview of disagreement on the 
form and competences the European border agency should have, as these 
were directly tied to the state sovereignty of the member states. We then 
move to analyse the 2015 proposal for EBCG with regard to sovereignty, the 
talks including member states and Union institutions over the proposal and 
the final legal act. 
For the positions of the member states within the Council we used data 
gathered from directly involved civil servants from different member states 
and the transcripts of the statements of the member states representatives 
during the working bodies meetings. Several interviews were conducted 
in the years 2017 and 2018 in order to reconstruct the debate on the 
issues covered in the Article. We also used the public statements of the 
representatives of the member states (mostly ministers of interior) as a way 
how to define a position of that particular member state, if possible.
1 STATE SOVEREIGNTY, EUROPEAN UNION AND BORDERS
Borders and border protection have been traditionally closely tied with 
the concept of state sovereignty as the first marks the territory of the state 
and the second enables to decide who is allowed to enter its territory and 
who is not. In the last few decades the traditional view was essentially 
contested, though, and large part of the discussion would be connected to 
the relation between nation-state sovereignty and the emergence of new 
power formations, such as European Union (Jones, 2017, p. 3).
The gradual development of European integration, including building 
of the Schengen area, led to the change of perception of borders, including 
the important division between internal and external borders within the 
Schengen area. As Rudolf puts it, „closure from outside Europe was deemed 
a necessary condition for general acceptance of openness within the 
European Union“(Rudolf, 2005 p. 11).
One of the main functions of borders is their control function, thus 
controlling who enters the territory. In the context of European integration 
and the building of the Schengen area “the idea behind softening borders in 
the Schengen zone is that internal frontiers become soft, while external ones 
are hard, effectively creating a larger zone of free movement, but one with 
sharper edges…so entry to the area is strictly controlled”(Grabbe, 2000, p. 
527).
In the EU reality the above mentioned means that the states in the EU 
were generally ready to give up on the control of internal borders, retreating 
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back to it only in the state that they perceive as emergency, such as the 
current migration crisis. At the same time, they concentrate much more 
on the control of the external borders and so far, were quite reluctant to 
pass their competences on the Union level, as will be noted further. All this 
then has connection to the existence of the Schengen area, where the states 
inside the area ore quite dependent on the level of protection provided by 
the frontline states that lie on the external border.
In the following text we will concentrate on the discussion over EU level 
of border protection in the past two decades, focusing also on the pre-
FRONTEX era and the role sovereignty played while the Agency was being 
established. We will show that the role of the sovereignty was central to all 
the debates about fostering the mandate of the Agency since. Then we move 
to the debate on the establishing of EBCG and we will take a closer look on 
the role of sovereignty within it.
2 DEVELOPMENT OF THINKING ABOUT EUROPEAN BORDER 
PROTECTION 
The abolishment of internal border controls between six member states 
of the EU signing the Schengen Agreement in 1985, and its subsequent 
incorporation in the communitarian law by the Treaty of Amsterdam, was 
reflected by the new policy priorities set in the area of freedom, security 
and justice. In the Tampere Programme from 1999 the European Council 
underlined “…the importance of the effective control of the Union’s future 
external border’s protection by specialised trained professionals…” (European 
Council, 1999, par. 25). 
The growing interest in the common borders’ protection was further 
driven by the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the impending 
enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. The terrorist attacks had 
closely interlinked the migration and borders with the issue of security and 
reinforced widespread calls for stricter border controls (Neal, 2009, p 338; 
Jorry, 2007, p. 1). Large enlargement eastwards and to the Balkans was a source 
of atmosphere of uncertainty as the EU member states were rather sceptical 
about the capabilities of the acceding states to protect their borders. After the 
enlargement, a large part of the new common external border of the EU would 
be geographically found on their territories and the mistrust towards the new 
members and concern of a possible increase of irregular immigration were 
embodied in the view that the EU would have “more vulnerable” borders after 
the enlargement (Ekelund, 2014, p. 105; Hobbing, 2005 p. 2-3).
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The idea to create a common border guard was presented to the Council 
by Germany and Italy early in 2001. In the autumn of that year, a group of 
member states, led by Italy and comprising of Belgium, Germany, France 
and Spain, launched a feasibility study on “European Border Police” backed 
by the European Commission. The states who were in favour of creating 
a supranational unit guarding the borders perceived it as a way to ensure 
burden sharing and solidarity between the old and new member states 
and to improve personnel and technical cooperation. It was supposed 
to be a move towards deeper political integration (Monar, 2006; Carrera, 
2010, p. 2). Some of the member states were quite unenthusiastic in the 
debates about centralized European border police though. The most visible 
example of this reluctance was the United Kingdom (Zaiotti, 2008, p. 227). 
With the impossibility to find a strong solution before, in December 2001 
the member states formulated the compromise in the Laeken Declaration, 
in which the Council and the Commission were given a mandate to “…work 
out arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external 
border control and examine the conditions in which a mechanism or common 
services to control external borders could be created…” (European Council, 
2001, par. 42). While governments of some member states had already 
been using the term “European border guard” or “European border police”, 
the declaration carefully avoided such an expression (Monar, 2006), not to 
create the perception of building a strong European body that some of the 
member states opposed.
In May 2002 Commission relased Communication “Towards an integrated 
management of external borders”. With the emphasis on the gradual 
development of border cooperation it tried to satisfy both the supporters of 
centralization and its opponents. While the communication was generally 
positively received,   a few Member States were principally against the idea 
to create a communitary European border guard (Monar, 2006; Parkes, 
2015, p. 64; Leonard, 2009, p. 378). 
The same month the results of the Feasibility study led by Italy were 
presented in Rome. The study came up with more an intergovernmental 
model based on a polycentric network of national border forces since it had 
brought together national experts who largely had defended their national 
systems of border protection. Benelux, Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain 
supported the paper. (Monar, 2006; Wolff - Schout, 2013, p. 311).
The European Council discussed the topic of border guard in June 
2003 and prompted the Commission to seek new institutional structures 
and mechanisms in order to improve border cooperation (Commission 
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of European Communities 2003, p.3). This time, the Commission started 
to work on a proposal for the establishment of a border agency (Ekelund, 
2014, p. 106). The idea of creating a border guard was not favoured after 
2002 but that does not mean that it was completely forgotten. What the 
debates in 2001 and 2002 nonetheless disclosed were the differing views 
of the actors on how far the political integration in the field of border 
management should be advanced. The Commission, trying to capitalize on 
the calls for more security measures after 2001, suggested its concept of 
centralised border guard but ultimately met with resistance from member 
states. Generally, the states were not convinced that the added value of 
creating a strong institution could compensate for the partial loss of their 
sovereignty (Hrabálek, 2010, p. 62 - 63). 
3 CREATING FRONTEX AS A COMPROMISE
Neal describes the period between 2001 and 2003 as a “process of 
negotiation, accommodation and compromise between the Commission and 
the Council and negotiation, accommodation and compromise between the 
Member States in the Council” (Neal, 2009, 340). The result was the Council 
Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing FRONTEX. The difference between 
the European Border Guard as envisioned by the Commission and the 
actual outcome of deliberations in the form of agency was quite substantial. 
Frontex was given the task of multilateral coordinating activities at the 
border, while the actual sovereignty over the borders in terms of day-to-day 
border management remained in the hands of member states (Kasparek, 
2010, p. 123).
The fact that the states were not ready to give up their sovereignty in this 
regard, is obvious from the name of the agency alone. In the initial proposal 
the Commission designed the “European Agency for the management of 
operational cooperation at the external borders”. The regulation that was 
later adopted after the negotiations with the Council establishes “European 
agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external 
borders of the Member States of the European Union” (Jeandesboz, 2008, 
p. 3). The Commission also proposed that Frontex should be overseen by 
Management Board comprising of twelve members representing member 
states and two members of the Commission (Commission, 2003, p. 25).  The 
Council was not really inclined to this idea and argued that every member 
state should have its representative in the Management Board, what is the 
structure that was later adopted and implemented (Ekelund, 2014, p. 109). 
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Overall, the member states were able to agree fairly quickly on the creation 
of the agency, which they could all control through the management board. 
Their positions were not challenged by the European parliament as at the 
time of approval of the proposal the Parliament could be only consulted 
(Leonard, 2009, p. 381).
Frontex was created as a compromise between the European 
Commission’s plan for integrated border management under the leadership 
of European institution and the unwillingness of the states to give up 
control over their parts of common external border shared by the Schengen 
agreements (Kasparek, 2010, p. 123). The agency has emerged as a politically 
acceptable answer to bridge the full regulatory communitarization border 
management on the one hand and pure intergovernmental approach on the 
other hand (Pollak-Slominski, 2009, p. 909). The compromise embodied 
in the agency’s mandate can be observed at two levels. The first one is the 
compromise between the Commission’s vision and the vision of the Council 
as a whole. This level can be described as an inter-institutional and clearly 
the position of the Council prevailed in the negotiations. The second, intra-
institutional level can be characterized by clash of member states’ differing 
opinions in the inside of the Council. The main proponents of a strong agency 
were the states who were affected by an increased influx of illegal migration 
and who expected for the agency to reduce their burden, such as Spain and 
Italy, plus the states, who as destination countries relied on the protection 
of common border, such as most notably Germany. However, during the 
negotiations in the Council, these countries were forced to compromise on 
their demands and accept the agency in a form that the more conservative 
states emphasising their territorial sovereignty would agree on (Hrabálek, 
2010, p. 64). 
Although the agency was established under the first pillar, its performance 
and competences were guided by a strong intergovernmental logic. Frontex 
from its start largely depended on the willingness of member states to 
provide it with equipment and to participate in joint operations, which 
quickly became the predominant activity of the Agency (Carrera, 2010, p. 
23). 
The positive impact of Frontex activities on EU border management 
was recognized swiftly (Cortinovis, 2015, p. 257). Nevertheless, from 
the start there had been numerous calls for strengthening the agency’s 
accountability and extending its mandate. The European Commission and 
the European Parliament have always been the proponents of the extension 
of the mandate of Frontex as they traditionally shared the view that the EU’s 
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external border is constituted by the common Schengen border and thus 
should be overlooked by a supranational actor (Parkes, 2015, p. 55-56). 
Even the member states called for the agency to be more powerful, however 
as Carrera notes, were then reluctant to grant Frontex more powers and 
autonomy during the negotiations in Council (Carrera, 2010, p. 23). 
The debates revolved mainly around the provision of technical equipment 
and personnel to the agency by member states and its responsibility and 
accountability within the implemented joint operations. The European Union 
has sought to reflect the perceived shortcomings by adopting amendments 
to the Regulation in 2007, 2013 and 2014. The creation of Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams (RABITs), which introduced the element of “compulsory 
solidarity” in urgent and exceptional pressure, and subsequently the 
European Border Guard Teams (EBGT) for the deployment not only in rapid 
interventions but also in joint operations can be understood as a step in the 
process of evolution of border guards (Mungianu, 2013, p. 380).
4 MIGRATION CRISIS – CHANGING CONTEXT
Since the year 2010 the EU had to cope with an increased migratory 
pressure mainly on the southern external borders due to the outbreak of 
military conflicts in a number of states (civil conflicts in Libya, Syria, Iraq) 
(Ramboll & Eurasylum, 2015, p. 101). Reflecting the change in the primary 
law in the Lisbon Treaty, which codified the objective of “the gradual 
introduction of an integrated management system for external borders” in 
the Article 77 (1) (c) TFEU, the European Council invited the Commission 
“to initiate a debate on the long-term development of FRONTEX”. In 2013 
the Unisys contracted by Commission conducted a feasibility study on 
the creation of a European System of Border Guards. According to the 
study’s results, the majority of member states supported the increasing 
role of Frontex in EU border management but still considered the idea of 
centralised European border guard as premature (Unisys, 2014, p. 17-18). 
The year 2015 marked another challenge for the EU, as between January 
and November nearly 1, 5 million of people have crossed the external EU 
borders illegally (Commission, ESBG Proposal: 2). The European Agenda on 
Migration adopted by the Commission in May 2015, a political programme 
outlining priorities in the European migration, asylum and border policies, 
identified as one of the short-term goals to triple the capacities and the 
budget of Frontex (European Commission, 2015a). In the Commission’s 
work programme “No time business as Usual” the Commission declared 
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its aim to prepare the proposal to develop Frontex “into a fully operational 
European Border and Coast guard system” in accordance with the Juncker’s 
State of the Union Speech from September 2015 (European Commission, 
2015b, p. 11; European Commission, 2015c). The Commission’s Proposal 
for the creation of a European Border and Coast Guard was presented in 
December 2015 and approved in September 2016. The European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency was officially launched in October 2016.
5 SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EBCG PROPOSAL
The proposal for EBCG, presented on 15th December 2015, moved the 
relation between the European and national border protection competences 
further towards a stronger role of the European Commission. In its Article 
18 (1) it said:
“Where a Member State does not take the necessary corrective measures 
in accordance with a decision of the Management Board referred to in 
Article 12(6) or in the event of disproportionate migratory pressure 
at the external border, rendering the control of the external borders 
ineffective to such an extent that it risks putting in jeopardy the 
functioning of the Schengen area, the Commission, after consulting 
the Agency, may adopt a decision by means of an implementing 
act, identifying the measures to be implemented by the Agency and 
requiring the Member State concerned to cooperate with the Agency in 
the implementation of those measures. Those implementing acts shall 
be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to 
in Article 79(2).
On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency relating to the 
functioning of the Schengen area, the Commission shall adopt 
immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 79(5).”
This article would strengthen the possibility to intervene in reluctant 
member states, based on the decision of the Commission. Partially its 
inclusion was formed by the previous experience with Greece from year 
2015. Although the country was under serious pressure during that year, 
for a long time it was not very willing to accept more help from FRONTEX 
and so there was certain level of disagreement between Greece and other 
member states (Reuters, 2015).
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During the presentation of the text at the working group of the Council 
the Commission said that it didn’t expect this ever to be applied as there 
was significant number of steps preceding its application. As such, the 
Commission declared it did not see that Article affected the sovereignty of 
the member states. 
The possibility of use of the right to intervene proposed in Article 18 was 
rather “crisis-driven” and the new system „would therefore not establish a 
permanent and stable deployment of European border guard teams along 
all EU external common borders, irrespective of the level of ‘vulnerability“ 
(Carrera – den Hertog, 2016, p. 12). But shortly after the proposal on ECBG was 
put on the table, some of the high officials of EU member states have openly 
voiced their concern over this part of the proposal affecting their sovereignty. 
Before we proceed with the positions of the member states within Council, we 
will provide few examples of the open critics of the “right to intervene”. 
Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszcykowski told on a Polish radio that 
the “border troops have no democratic legitimacy” and that the proposal 
“would create an organisation that could arbitrarily make decisions about 
member states without giving them any voice in the process.” (WSWS.org, 
2015). Greek Alternate Foreign Minister for European Affairs Nikos Xydakis 
also openly questioned the Article 18 saying that “it touches the core of 
national sovereignty and European treaties” (Euractiv, 2015). Swedish 
Interior Minister Anders Ygeman was also among those that would be rather 
sceptical about the intervention mechanism, as he said that “border control 
is the competence for the member states, and it’s hard to say that there is a 
need to impose that on member states forcefully” (Politico.eu, 2015b).
Spanish Minister of Interior Jorge Fernández Díaz was also very sceptical 
to the proposal, as he said it would “serve for nothing”. He would base his 
argument on sovereignty of each member state to guard its borders and he 
would also point out that the time schedule was too fast for such a delicate 
proposal (EPNacional.es, 2015). 
Between the open supporters of Article 18 we could find the “heavy-
weight” interior ministers - Bernard Cazeneuve from France and Thomas de 
Maizière from Germany, who sent an open letter to the Commission saying 
that “in exceptional circumstances, Frontex should also take initiative to 
deploy under its own responsibility rapid intervention teams at its external 
borders.” (Politico.eu, 2015a).
The critique of the proposal from some of the high-rank politicians of 
EU member states only reflects the reality of the “old FRONTEX” when the 
member states were cautious about their sovereignty and would tend to 
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rather increase the budget of the Agency than to provide it with genuine 
autonomy and competences necessary for its proper functioning.
Apart from the above mentioned public statements, there was a serious 
debate over Article 18 within the working bodies of the Council. We have 
tried to reconstruct these debates based on the data gathered from the 
officials of the member states3. Article 18 was the most debated article 
of the whole proposal and large number of Member States spoke about 
sovereignty and the responsibility for the control of the border.
Based on the debates within the Council we have tried to categorize the 
Member States into 3 separate groups. First groups are the Supporters, group 
of states that would initially support the proposal including the possible 
right to intervention and the strengthened role of the Commission. Second 
group would be the Cautious, state that would not openly criticize the article 
but would mention that sovereignty would have to be taken into account 
and the Member states should take part in the decisions. The third group 
would be the Opponents, a group of states that would be openly against the 
possible intervention. We are aware of the fact that distributing the states 
into three categories must be rather unprecise, but it is probably closest one 
could get, given the accessibility of the data. Also, the positions mentioned 
are rather initial positions of the member states that were subject to rapid 
change, as the negotiations were led under the pressure to establish EBCG 
quickly in order to react to the migration crisis and there was a significant 
shift in positions in the Council during the negotiations.
The argumentation of the first group of states was based on an 
assumption that European solution should be sought. This group included 
Germany as the largest receiver of migrants with strong interest in the 
functioning of external borders. Germany, together with France as its ally 
and also large receiver of migrants, would be the strongest supporter of 
the EBCG proposal, including Article 18. But these two countries were not 
alone, for example Portugal during the Council meeting, although aware of 
sovereignty problems, spoke about a necessity of a „shared competence“, as 
border protection is a European problem.
As for the group of Cautious states, these have mentioned during the initial 
debates that compliance of the Article 18 with the principle of sovereignty 
would have to be further enquired. This means that these states did not 
support the idea of right to intervene, but neither were they openly against 
it and pointed to the necessity to enquire further the relation of Article 18 to 
national sovereignty of the member states. The Cautious group would be the 
3 The discussions were confidential and the officials would not wish to be named.
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largest and if we count it together with the opponents, there would be a vast 
majority of member states that would have to certain extent problems with 
strong role of the European Commission in the intervention mechanism.
The last group of states, the Opponents, voiced severe concerns about 
how Article 18 touches national sovereignty. Their position would be that 
the proposal should not interfere with the national competence of the 
member states and their responsibility for border protection. They would 
question the very necessity of European mechanism and they would be 
against the initiative role of the European Commission set in the proposal. 
Typical members of this group were member states located at the exposed 
part of the external border, such as Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta or Bulgaria. 
Also Poland forms a large part of external border, although the country was 
not under heavy migratory pressure during 2015.
Contrary to the argument of frontline states this group also included 
Sweden as a state that was together with Germany one of the largest 
receivers of migrants in 2015. Sweden and other Nordic country, Norway – 
a non-EU Schengen member, were also quite critical to the right to intervene 
during the Council meetings.
Table 1: Positions of state towards the right to intervene (Article 18 of EBCG 
proposal)4
Source: Authors based on the public statements and discussions with officials
4 United Kingdom and Ireland were not full members of Schengen due to their non-
participation in Schengen agreement. Luxembourg and Netherlands were a presidency 
states when the proposal was mostly negotiated and as such thein positions are excluded as 
Theky could be biased. 
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The examples of Italy, Greece and Spain present a significant shift in the 
perception of European border protection. Previously these states would be 
proponents of stronger competences of FRONTEX, in the discussions over 
EBCG mandate they belonged to strongest opponents of the right to intervene 
and the necessity to use “European” forces on the national borders of the 
member states. On the other side Poland, while being seed of FRONTEX, 
shows long-term resistance to any possible breach into sovereignty at 
borders that was also visible during the previous enlargements of the 
mandate of FRONTEX.   
Soon after the talks  started it proved to be unrealistic to proceed with 
the right to intervene in the way how it was proposed by the Commission, 
as the vast number of states was opposing it and others were also rather 
sceptical to it. The debate then moved to keep the key decision-making 
power on possible interventions in the Council, what was a “reaffirmation of 
member states’ primary competence regarding the management of national 
borders“(Monar, 2017, p. 8).
The European Commission was thus unsuccessful with its attempt to 
gain more competences in border management, facing resistance of large 
amount of member states. The argument was, like in the cases described 
above, the sovereignty of member states and their prime responsibility for 
border protection, or more precisely, for internal security as stated by Article 
72 of TFEU. The Article 18 was thus changed and the mechanism is similar 
to the Article 26 of Schengen Borders Code that covers the reinstatement of 
the internal borders and where the member states play crucial role (Rijpma, 
2016, p. 18) in starting this ultima ratio solution. 
CONCLUSION
Even though the migration pressure in the years 2015 and 2016 was high 
and the quickness with which the proposal transforming the “old FRONTEX” 
into a new EBCG was rather unprecedented, the logic of the member states 
in the Council didn’t change much vis-a-vis the previous debates over the 
mandates of FRONTEX. State sovereignty remained the most discussed 
issue with many member states unwilling to pass more competences to the 
Union level. And in the end, the member states were successful in keeping 
control over the functioning of EBCG.
In this paper we tried to identify the proponents and opponents of the 
mechanism included in Article 18. As for the proponents the biggest role 
was played by the Franco-German tandem. Both countries were affected by 
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the migratory flows and at the same time they were not countries of entry 
for migrants, making application of the right to intervene against them 
unlikely. Their position was to keep the external borders under control as 
much as possible and to avoid repeating problems between FRONTEX and a 
member state at the border, such as in the case of Greece in 2015. 
Large part of EU states raised certain concerns about sovereignty, even 
though they did not explicitly stand against the Article 18, during the 
meetings in the Council.  The largest opponents of the right to intervene, 
that would openly question both the very need of such a right and the 
position of the European Commission within the mechanism, were mostly 
the “frontline” states. These states drew objections toward the right to 
intervene as they perceived it as endangering their sovereignty. Countries 
such as Italy, Greece or Hungary were directly on the main migration routes 
in 2015 and under heavy pressure. Spain had a recent experience with 
migration pressure before the crisis. As such, they could feel endangered by 
the possible use of the right to intervene against themselves. This would be 
particularly true for Greece that had difficulties cooperating with FRONTEX 
in 2015 and was also in conflict with some of the member states due to its 
(in)capacity to protect external border.
The result of these strong concerns about sovereignty was that the right 
to intervene with a strong role of the European Commission was absent 
from the final version of EBCG regulation and the decision-making powers 
for the mechanism moved to the Council. As in the previous situations, such 
as establishing the mandate of FRONTEX or enlarging it later, the member 
states were able to keep the responsibility for border protection with the 
newly established ECBG, showing how sensitive nature borders have. But 
the case has also shown differing views between states that were affected 
by the migration wave and states which wanted to create a mechanism how 
to strengthen external border protection and cooperation and states at the 
border, for which the protection of their sovereignty was principal.
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